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研究视角聚集于 CEO-CFO 内部联结对企业税收规避的影响。采用 2004-2013 年我国





























Beginning with the study by  Allingham&Sandmo（1972） [1], corporate tax 
avoidance has been a popular topic for scholars, and abundant research results have been 
published. The establishment of modern enterprise system caused the separation of the 
right of management from the right of ownership, researches have proved the motivation 
of managers’ tax avoidance as well as the tax avoidance behavior and result of different 
corporate governance degree under the framework of principal-agent theory. 
Research methods in social network connection have been bought into the research 
area of corporate governance. The theory of internal social network, based on the theory of 
like attract like, suggest that the similarity of demographic characteristic, personality and 
value will promote the attraction within the network members, and thus strengthen their 
social integration. The theory of like attract like bring the “non-rationality” into the 
analysis of network members, suggesting the attraction will not just strengthen the social 
integration, but also promote the conspiracy. 
Based on the above research results, under the theory of like attract like, this papers 
concentrate on the effect of CEO-CFO affiliation on corporate tax avoidance. This paper 
uses the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2013. The results show 
that the CEO-CFO affiliation will facilitate corporate tax avoidance. The internal 
connection based on the similar education or professional title also facilitates the level of 
corporate tax avoidance. Further, the analysis result of different property rights shows that 
the CEO-CFO affiliation facilitates the tax avoidance for whether the state-owner 
enterprise or the non-state-owned enterprises, and these two different property rights don’t 
show significant difference. After bringing into the regional tax administration variable, 
this paper finds that the CEO-CFO affiliation facilitate the tax avoidance in high tax 
administration area but doesn’t affect the tax avoidance significantly in low tax 
administration area. It means that CEO’s motivation for tax avoidance increases in high 
tax administration area and which has been satisfied by the means of conspire with the 















of corporate governance, and extend the research of corporate tax avoidance based on the 
framework of corporate governance.  
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和 Kim，2009[9]），本文认为，随着 CFO 在企业内部承担的角色越来越重要，加上
CFO 对企业财务报告质量承担更直接的责任，在企业避税的过程中也更多地扮演了
具有专业税法技能人员的角色，因而 CEO 和 CFO 之间的内部网络联结将直接影响
企业的避税安排。 











































































量的选取（包括 CEO – CFO 内部联结变量、企业避税变量、主要控制变量、所有权
性质变量、企业税收征管强度变量）、模型的构建。 
第五部分：实证结果分析。这一部分将以三个假设为基础分别报告论文的描述























2.1 企业避税基本理论及计量方法  
2.1.1 企业避税的“光谱分析” 













































（Jensen 和 Meckling，1976）[15]。 































Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations Database”.  
Fulltexts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on 
http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit requests online, or consult the interlibrary 
loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn 
for delivery details. 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
